Introduction
As our society progresses based on advancing technology, important aspects emerge concerning the use of the technological infrastructure and information technology (IT) and especially the importance of information security, the privacy of the individual etc. which characterise the potential of the information era. Throughout related references we find as a key concept the term information security; but in the context of an information system (IS), combining people, information, software, hardware and procedures, information security alone cannot ensure the security of the entire system. IS security is indeed a broader term, containing the set of principles, regulations, methodologies, techniques and tools we establish to protect an IS, or any of its parts, from potential threats.
Recent surveys indicate the need of the global market for secure systems but note that there are not many out there that have understood how to achieve it. In a worldwide survey, Duncan (1995) reports that 40 percent of the sample either does not have a security plan at all and there are no concerns about it, or there is a plan for it in the future, because at that time it was not considered of high priority. Most of them, though, begin to realise the importance of information security for the contemporary business world; many problems that concern business life have emerged related to information and infrastructure security, like the hacking of the DVD encoding scheme, or personal privacy, as in the case of RealNetworks that distributed a special free software that could monitor an individual's listening habits (Hancock, 1999) . In the same reference is stated that IS managers are under more stress than ever about security. Henderson and Snyder (1999) sustain the same point in an essay that indicates the emerging importance of privacy and its implications to IS managers and their duties. Most of the researchers agree that many of the securityrelated problems of ISs reside on the fact that their development practices could not foresee them and, furthermore, resolve them.
Existent methodologies for IS development do not meet the needs for resolving the security-related IS problems, as most of them neither include specialised handling of the security requirements nor can create a control environment early in the development process, i.e. a set of procedures and technical measures with which an IS can be secured against potential risks. In addition there are not many adequate studies for the application and use of existing techniques and tools that could contribute to the formal and convenient integration of the security requirements within the IS development requirements (Hitchings, 1995) .
Moreover, there is in fact a twofold change in the field of IS development practices. Development of (successful or unsuccessful) systems could be achieved by a combination of conventional approaches or by entirely innovative techniques. Changes have been introduced to development scenarios (who is carrying out the development and how) and to development practices as well, e.g. modular, component-based system implementation rather that from-scratch monolithic systems construction. Wood and Snow (1995) note that the market trend for quality certification through compliance with ISO 9000 series, or other
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standards such as the Capability Maturity Model (CMM), could strengthen the initiatives of organisations for IS assurance and security. Quality certification is not directly linked to security aspects, but there are strong relating requirements for: duty separation, job descriptions and document control; and validity and availability of documentation and forms. Fillery and Chantler (1994) view this as a problematic situation and argue that lack of quality procedures and assurance in IT production is the heart of the problem and dealing with this issue is essential for embedding worthy security features in them. Information security problems in contemporary product/component-oriented development practices could be resolved in the context of quality assurance, since each single product could be validated and assured properly. The validation of products along with process assurance is the heart of the holistic proposal from Eloff and Von Solms (2000) , which exploits this trend and combines both system components and system processes. The previous proposals address the importance of information security in the modern world and the need to be integrated in systems development, but still, they do not refer explicitly to the changes that need to be introduced in development practices, actors and scenarios. Furthermore, assurance of high-quality development cannot by itself ensure security, as even the perfect product could be subject of misuse. Thus, this paper sets off to address the following questions: 1 What do practitioners and developers do when they face requirements for secure systems development, how do they integrate security concerns to their development processes? And in particular: Do they, and if so how do they, implement security solutions early in the development processes? How do the implemented solutions get integrated to the overall organisational structure and everyday life of a particular organisational environment? 2 What perceptions of security do the involved IS stakeholders have? What implications do those perceptions have in the development of secure systems?
Information security is a field combining technical aspects as well as social, cultural and legal/regulatory concerns. Most of the attempts to resolve security problems are focused largely upon the technological component, ignoring important contextual`s oft'' parameters, enlarging in this way the gap between real world's requirements for secure systems and the means to achieve it.
Development approaches
In the past the information systems' boundaries within the organisation were quite clear and limited. As business process support tools their essence and structure were stable, confined first to automation of basic transaction processing, to explode then in a multiplicity of forms of management support tools. The basic tenets of systems development theory and practice were that systems could be produced in a specific and (in theory) standardised way, proceeding linearly through well defined stages, including a substantial programming effort, intersected by inspection and feedback milestones. The systems engineering paradigm is encapsulated in most methodologies available (Avison and Fitzgerald, 1993) .
Nevertheless, the``profile'' of systems development approaches has undergone fundamental changes along with the evolution of technology, as well as the nature of systems found in today's enterprises. In essence, the traditional approach, based on the life cycle concept for a systems project, cannot capture the extensive use of commercially available application platforms as a basis for new systems development. Moreover, the vast variety of commercially available software products that can be combined to reach the required functionality for a particular system makes component-based development a realistic option. In all, systems development``from scratch'' is far less practiced compared to ten years ago. The information systems literature, in which the methodologies movement flourished in the 1980s and early 1990s, has not addressed sufficiently the new norms of practice. In this paper, we introduce a rudimentary classification of contemporary systems development practices along the well-known``make or buy'' divide. Most systems projects are now anchored on the``buy'' maxim; there we introduce two development approaches, namely single product based and componentbased development. On the``make'' side we have proprietary development. We argue that each of these three approaches introduces different challenges to developers regarding security concerns.
When the IS department could not allocate the requested human resources, or its resources did not qualify in terms of experience and know-how for a specific development project, a ready-made system could have been purchased. At such times a system could be considered an accounting package and the computer in which this resided. Therefore the scope of a ready-made solution could vary from a single package to a comprehensive IS. In the case that more than one application was chosen and eventually operating, it was practically very difficult to integrate them so as to produce a unified and comprehensive organisational information management solution. The composition of the technical infrastructure was made from ready packages in whose operational philosophy should the organisation fit-in. This is a major contradiction to in-house development of a solution, which leads to systems tailored to a particular organisation's needs and character. But contemporary development practices managed to soft-pedal this contradiction.
Single-product based (or configuration) development
The evolution of the technological infrastructure, the knowledge that evolved about systems development and results from the successful, or not, application of a number of ready-made systems, led to the creation and institution of basic parts of technology solutions (core systems), that, deployed with a proper configuration, could fit-in to any organisational environment (Fitzgerald, 1998) . This practice, termed as single-product based development or configuration development, has led to the development of information technologies that implement a core functionality of an organisation and are customisable (can be properly configured) depending on the environment. Examples of such systems are the enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems such as the SAP, BAAN and PeopleSoft product suites. Single-product systems enable the standardisation of business processes and also facilitate the difficult task of communication of horizontal applications within a vertical sector (Vasarhelyi and Kogan, 1999) .
Component-based development
Market requirements for successful and on-time delivered systems that can face the rapid changing contemporary business and social reality led to a second popular practice of developing systems, the component-based development. Development efforts are allocated to relatively independent sectors/ sub-systems of a manageable size that could possibly be implemented by different and topologically distributed teams. Monolithic systems are abandoned as they fail to meet the needs of modern business processes and to be delivered on time.
By following this practice, one can schedule earlier the delivery of the critical system's components and in general, all components can be arranged and scheduled to be delivered in terms of their priority (Clements, 1995) . In addition, basic user requirements can be met from the beginning of the development effort, so that an organisation could take advantage of the system before this is fully implemented and deployed. This principle empowers rapid application development (RAD) practices that substitute monolithic application development with modularised, componentbased systems, the components of which have been properly evaluated by the system's endusers and domain experts. There is a general impression that the conventional linear lifecycle of monolithic systems cannot contribute anymore to the development of successful systems and their on-time delivery (Howard et al., 1999) .
Proprietary development
Organisations' informational needs were defined in the past by the relatively small requirements for automation of their processes. The main objective was computerisation and not the establishment of a comprehensive information system; technology was used as a means to reduce bureaucracy and ease the time-consuming manual stages of business transactions with customers, intermediates, suppliers and employees.
The role of the IS department, wherever it existed autonomously and not as a part of the accounting or the financial management department, contained more or less the tasks of the IS construction and maintenance. This department, or departmental division, was the actual implementer (Fowler and Wilkinson, 1998) . Therefore, apart from the technical support of the organisational infrastructure it was responsible for the preparation, implementation and deployment of technical solutions. This is a common practice that is still in use, especially in organisations where they maintain an IS department of a respectful size.
Development processes are centred on the requirements as expressed by the organisation stakeholders and the development staff is usually recruited from within the organisation. The development practice (methodology, tools) could be chosen with criteria based on cost and the experience of the staff in relative previous projects, whilst the scope of the development project is usually limited. This is the reason why the conventional IS department of user organisations was composed of technicians and system administrators for the support functions and analysts/programmers for the development functions. Whenever the adequacy of the IS department is not ideal, the implementation of such a proprietary solution can be given by contract to a third party. Therefore, we can identify different development scenarios, as introduced in the following section.
Scenarios of practice and the involved stakeholders Development scenarios
Organisations were traditionally utilising their own internal resources when in need for arranging solutions for processes that required informational support and automation. People from the IS department, or the division of an economical department that was functioning as such, were responsible for collecting requirements, designing and implementing a solution, as well as maintaining its operation. This is a common practice that is still in use, especially when the size and the expertise of the IS department is of such volume to allow full in-house development of information systems or simpler applications. In cases that the IS department was not capable of handling a development project by itself (lack of expertise or tools), but the adequacy of the existing human resources was trusted to be exploited, the leadership of the project was appointed to experienced external partners. Specially contracted managers were taking over and were responsible for coordinating and leading the requirements management, analysis and design of the solution and supervising its implementation by making use of every possible human resource.
The role of those consultants is to guide the development project through its different stages. This practice, i.e. use of external consultancy, was quite popular in the past, particularly amongst public sector organisations, before it was established as a valid development practice for business as well. It appeared before the trend of assigning the whole project to a body of experts and was characterised by the temporal engagement of external resources through contracts. In the past this practice could eventually lead to the increment of the IS department size, as some times the consultant was totally integrated with the organisational environment and culture, s/he was staying with it and the cooperation was continuing with other development projects or studies. On the contrary, nowadays there are established firms that are widely respected for providing exactly such consulting services. Their asset is their expertise in consulting about and not in developing systems.
But the effort for the reduction of the IS's operation and maintenance cost led to the idea of the complete assignment of the implementation, operation and maintenance of an IS by a third party. There are studies in the literature in which the downsizing of the conventional IS department is clearly identified in terms of the services and human resources that it is responsible for; at the same time, the size of the outsourcing contracts evolves with a fast rhythm. In particular, IS departments worldwide are reduced in terms of their human resources (about 11 percent per year), whilst more than half of the organisations are reducing gradually the services of their IS functions; full IS outsourcing organisations are steadily increasing by 5 percent per year (Whyte et al., 1997; Virgo, 1996) . In terms of financial figures, the contracts of fully outsourced IT projects were estimated about $15 billion, while for 2001 it is expected to reach $27 billion. In the UK the same figure was estimated for this year as of $7.6 billion (Slaughter and Soon, 1996) .
Development stakeholders
Through the previous scenarios we referred to several stakeholders. A stakeholder is anyone involved in the situation that could gain benefits from it (Pouloudi, 1999) . The key roles identified here were the developer, the consultant and the end-user. These are, at a high level of abstraction, the stakeholders of the development of a particular IS: the requesting for a system end-user organisation, the organisation responsible for developing it and perhaps the organisation that is assigned to guide, supervise and consult the development. The same stakeholders can be identified in terms of security as well, but in advance we have to involve the strong environmental influences (such as regulations, laws, ethics etc.) as an additional``stakeholder'', or an additional point of view.
Introducing security within IS development: an interpretive framework

Security issues within IS development approaches
One of the most important development expenses concerning information systems is their safeguarding against potential threats;
[ 186 ] this is a particularly effort-consuming process and it is almost always performed after their development. This idea in general does not necessarily bear negative consequences; it might have impacts though on the quality of the security measures that shall eventually be implemented. But, quite early, the traditional IS development practices introduced interesting security-related problems in the area.
In particular, take as an example in-house development; its positive consequence, whenever it is successful, is that the solution is detailed and fits into the particular organisational culture and the nature of its business sector. Therefore the produced solution has significant probabilities for successful introduction and use in its environment. But this, by itself, cannot ensure a series of other important factors such as maintainability, integration with other applications/systems etc. In particular, the development of individual applications per department/process or the purchasing of specialised packages (configuration development and off-the-shelf systems) lead to a situation where the technological infrastructure is a loose set of systems and applications that possibly do not form a comprehensive information system. This phenomenon in large-scale produces organisations that are characterised by loosely federated IT systems (federated organisations), whilst in a milder form can be identified as``technology islands''. In both cases a considerable amount of effort is needed for the control and audit of such organisational information systems (Grindley, 1995) .
Consequently, the previous finding has an important result; the integration of legacy systems and applications and the need for unified management of the business information and knowledge. Lack of standardisation in the development processes, which is fairly understandable as IS development is a scientific discipline as well as an art, makes the communication of different applications difficult, indeed. The development of a framework for integrated information management within the organisation is quite difficult, if not impossible, at least with the existent approaches and practices. This fact makes the incompatibilities of security requirements and policies a hard-to-resolve problem.
Another aspect concerns systems' capabilities for expanding and their further development (scalability). Usually, dedicated proprietary applications are not being developed with a scalability plan in mind, which is a restrictive fact for the lifetime of an application. Moreover, the forbidding cost of a total reconstruction leads a lot of times to continuation of its use, despite its identified problems, having as a consequence the devaluation of the solution, end-user dissatisfaction and possible rejection and even higher operational costs; the combination of obsolete technology and unhappy users is rather risky, in terms of IS security. All the above contribute to the high financial and operational cost of development and maintenance of in-house applications or staging of independent applications.
Throughout literature and practice several empirical security practices emerge to be suitable for use when developing information systems. We could summarise popular mainstream and old security practices by a grid as introduced in Table I . There we present some of the most popular of them through a``tacit'' categorisation (soon to be formally introduced).
In the sections to follow, we shall browse through some of the main critiques of the most important of those practices.
Issues emerging from custom development and associated risk analysis
When following such a practice, a rich picture of the existing information system needs to be extracted in the beginning, a fact that requires study of the system's structure and processes, in terms of available documentation, but most importantly, in terms of contacts with experienced users and designers of the system (involved stakeholders). From this picture the security analyst will try to evaluate the organisational information assets, whilst at the same time she/he must validate each assessment with the system's stakeholders. A very important tool to assist in this process is the concept of the risk analysis and management. Downs et al. (1992) study the relationship between CRAMM and SSADM. They say that the former has been indeed designed in such a way that could be exploited in every development project that uses a SSADM rationale. The technique that they imply is quite simple and has to do with the enrichment of the system's requirements (requirements catalogue), with the security requirements that one can trace for the organisational assets through CRAMM stage-1. Baskerville (1993) studies further this topic and he presents in detail the interface between SSADM/CRAMM.
[ 187 ] The development of security standards and product/process certification It is widely acceptable that risk analysis alone is not enough, especially when such approaches can only assure the IT infrastructure and cannot refer to procedures, administrative measures, cultural implications etc., the need to meet the security and protection requirements of the system in a comprehensive way is even more imperative. Several research projects in the past tried to address this problem; an example is the IBAG standard that was a EU initiative for the development of a common understanding between all stakeholders for concerns about security in the information age. In particular, this is a standard that describes the processes that are related to the security of the computational infrastructure in end-user organisations, vendors, internal/ external auditors etc. The second version of this standard is not complete and this research initiative has now been stopped, but this framework is an example of a coordinated attempt to approach the problem through many different perspectives. Its drawback is that it is not complete whilst being at a quite abstract level.
Similar concerns can be traced in the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC, 1991) standard as well. In order to certify a Target of Evaluation (TOE), an expert examines it according to a reference manual and then s/he can decide whether this TOE fulfils the proclaimed security features or not. Thereafter the TOE is being classified to a security level (the ITSEC suggests eight security levels, E0-E7, that correspond to levels from none to maximum possible security). The inspection and certification of products is definitely an assurance practice, despite not being enough by itself to produce secure information systems.
In the introduction we referred to Fillery and Chantler's (1994) view of the lack of quality procedures and assurance in IT production leading to defective products that are unstable and thus much more vulnerable. We agree that information security problems could be resolved within quality assurance, but this alone is not enough as even a product of extreme quality could be easily the subject of misuse and the means to realise malicious acts. The validation of products along with process assurance that Eloff and Von Solms (2000) suggest combines both system components and system processes, but still it resolves only a part of the problem.
Third party involvement and security responsibility transfer: baseline security provision
The security elements that can be found in contemporary development practices are not that clearly identified and categorised and, on the other hand, they have not been studied enough. Quite early, Wood (1995) traces the trend for embedding baseline security features in products. He states that by this way a big part of the responsibility for the assurance of the IS against potential threats is transferred to the vendor/service provider. Therefore, the security requirements in that case have to do with proper assertion and configuration of the existing features, as well as by extensive training in its use. Under the same perspective the user-organisations should actively take care of ensuring reliable systems and services warrantees and maintenance contracts.
The trend of providing baseline security features in off-the-shelf products evolved around the practice of outsourcing a part or the whole of IS development from ready-made components that a third party prepares for an organisation (vendor/ provider). The insecure contemporary business world and the strong market trends seem to imply the need for embedding elementary security features in products and services that vendors and providers offer. Furthermore, Vasarhelyi and Kogan (1999) note that the relative standardisation that the ERP platforms offer make audit processes easier and enhance reusability of the auditing material. The development of realtime audit applications and statistical analysis tools across horizontal platforms is also easier. The popularisation of similar systems and the existence of control and audit on them contribute to the dissemination of relative information, a thing that could be of no value for proprietary in-house systems.
IS security abstraction levels within an organisation
In the remainder of the study we shall refer to security issues within organisations using multiple tiers of abstraction. For our convenience we shall refer to them by the categorisation introduced in Table II , where we combine development approaches with security issues. We introduce three layers of security issues, namely: 1 strategic, the one of those with impact on corporate strategy (e.g. a security policy enforced by the management); 2 tactical, the one in terms of the methodologies/practices used to develop a system (for instance when the developed IS was a subject of risk analysis conduct); and 3 operations, the one concerning the technologies adopted to realise a development practice (for example the use of applied cryptography techniques for protecting sensitive data). Table II represents our interpretive framework for addressing and combining security issues with development practices and their involved stakeholders. We used this framework to structure a survey agenda to collect interview data and then present and interpret them. We think that such works findings are particularly important, as despite managerial and technological aspects concerning information systems having been well documented and argued, the related security concerns are not that much regarded.
Existing security practices in contemporary development approaches and their deficiencies: an indicative field study
Subject matter and goals of study and profile demographics
We presented earlier security features that can be traced within contemporary IS development practices. However, these have never been systematically written down in the relevant literature, therefore we think that it is important to study and categorise them and to explore systematically their impact on IS development. We shall trace and classify security practices per generic development practice, i.e. all those empirical security features that practitioners have established and use in order to resolve security related problems through systems development. It will also be interesting to present how the different stakeholders perceive/understand such concerns. From these points of view several factual observations in the field could be interpreted and justified, but this is something to be discussed later in this section. In this paragraph we introduce the specifications of the field study, our objectives and our profile's anatomy. Our research strategy and principles were based on our research questions and the conditions of the Greek market. To begin with, it was the nature of this problem, concerning several development stakeholders and the fact that there is no established practice to face it, which induced us to design a field study. It is interesting to explore what people do (if they do anyway) to secure their systems and how they manage to produce secure systems without an existing comprehensive and integrated framework. But due to its size comparing it to the global market, Greek reality implies a small sample population. Therefore, pure and hard statistical indexes are not of particular importance in our case (Jarvinen, 2000) . In such cases, interpretive research and empirical evaluation is rather appropriate, given that several principles of this kind of research will be finally secured (Klein and Myers, 1999) .
The size of the profile indicated the need for data of high quality and validity. Therefore in-person interviews were performed, rather that forwarding the instrument and waiting for its completion and return; this fact enhances the source's validity (Walsham, 1995) . Our profile consisted of all kinds of organisations, with an emphasis on developers, as our research work centres on systems development. The targeted profile was finally selected from an initial population of existing contacts after grouping them to clusters of similar potential, depending on their characteristics (their volume in terms of figures and people employed, their area of expertise and their goal). Then, within each one of those groups of candidates, companies to be contacted were randomly selected.
[ 189 ] Table III introduces the profile's demographics in terms of organisational expertise/market sector and the position of the subject in contact. Half of the profile are developer organisations, either large-or medium-sized; 25 percent consisted of consultants specialised in IT/economics consulting and the rest were user organisations from both the public and the private sector. This profile can be considered as largely representative of the relevant market in Greece and allows us to extract valuable information from it. Detailed comparisons and demography of the totality of the Greek market are introduced in other essays (e.g. Doukidis et al., 1992) .
We designed and used as a research instrument an interview agenda with open questions. This survey agenda was derived from the interpretive framework we introduced in Table II and can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 . We created three basic versions of our agenda, adopting the three perspectives that evolved through development scenarios: user organisations (U), developers (D) and consultants (C). We deliberately omitted the``environment'', as it is difficult to construct an instrument to Table III Demographics of the field study's profile
Contacted organisations
Subjects' position within organisation
Marine spares trading (U) Executive manager Armed forces (U)
Audit system development administrator Consultants/economists (C)
(1) General manager/(2) product manager Consultants/auditors (C)
(1) Departmental manager/(2) consultant IS development ± large (D)
Vice president IS development ± large (D)
Development manager IS development ± medium (D)
Development and support manager IS development ± medium (D)
General manager directly observe environmental factors. Key questions referenced the systems' or end-products' strategic impact for the organisational environment to be utilised, the practices that were used to develop/ acquire them, their theoretical security features and what is the actual use of them and why. Using the initial versions of our agendas in the first two pilot interviews, we experienced deficiencies that resulted in instrument redesign. Through a couple of successive interviews the interview agendas were redesigned and matured to their final versions.
In terms of the interviewed subjects, people having critical positions within different organisations were selected. We interviewed primarily systems managers from userorganisations, development and/or project managers from developer-organisations and consultants. In some cases the same person was interviewed twice or interviews were taken from two persons of nearly similar positions within an organisation. Such practices enhanced furthermore the accuracy and quality of data and facilitated better understanding of the perspectives of the different individuals involved.
The period of data collection through interviews lasted approximately four months. The final phase of this field study was the one of data analysis. As stated, statistical processing is of reduced value over such a sample, therefore we have exploited qualitative parameters focused on the raw interview data, adopting an action research discipline and its principles for interpreting such observations (Checkland, 1999; Eden and Huxham, 1996; Walsham, 1995) . Table IV is populated with interview raw data. Starting commenting on the actual data, we can say that as far as it concerns the first column, regarding the strategic impact of security integration, it clearly depicts the attitude of the higher management levels towards assurance of contracts and quality of services, and also their concerns for legal aspects (compliance with laws/regulations such as data protection acts) and security organisational integration.
Security issues identified on our framework concerning systems development practices
On the subsequent layer, we trace several techniques for the integration of security with development practices; the most common of them are: incorporation of confidentiality-integrityavailability requirements into the non-functional system requirements; and conduct of risk analysis based on a corporate model, which varies according to the approach followed, usually after the system has been developed and deployed.
For example, CRAMM's enterprise models are largely data (asset) centric and merely process orientated. Operations and technology issues concern standard compliance of acquired services/products (ISO 9000, BS 7799, OECD, TCSEC etc.) as well as market acceptance, ease of integration of a security solution with the corporate systems as well as assured continuity of systems and services.
Table V displays findings about implementation and integration practices. It represents security practices and their popularity among stakeholders, matching them to the corresponding abstraction level, as introduced earlier in Table II. The people involved in IS development see security issues as being:`t rouble'',``fuss'' or``tooth'' implying burden, as expressed mainly by operations, primarily in user organisations;`s helter'',``skull'' implying protection, as expressed by tactical management, primarily amongst developers; and`a bility'' (to produce, survive and conquer) implying the potential and adding value of security, as expressed by senior management and consultants. As far as it concerns security perceptions, we could say that those of users justify the present state of the market, where both developers and consultants agree that is at an early state of awareness and still rather immature. Developers see security as protective necessity for the future, whilst consultants realise that they do have a chance for opening a new market and having a new area of well-paid expertise.
We introduced the concept of standards earlier, but there is not that much time that they have become very popular amongst user organisations. On the other hand, consultants are very keen on them and try to signify to their (potential) clients their importance and their practical application. Consultants are also very keen on using risk analysis methods, either standardised (e.g. CRAMM) or proprietary, developed within their own organisations. They provide a Most of the developers that face security integration problems design cryptographic solutions and use cryptographic controls when it comes to securing stored or transmitted data. Nowadays they tend to use de facto standards of assuring transactions such as digital signatures and public key infrastructure (PKI) schemes solutions. This was a necessity once many proprietary protocols have been established within different products so far, which led to chaotic variations of similar functionality and end-systems' incompatibility. Development of de facto standards (the secure socket layer protocol for example) provides a basis of this kind of integration and interoperability problems resolution. Many of their products claim to bear embedded access control mechanisms in order to be able to get customised within any organisational environment and control access to sensitive and critical information.
For user organisations the belief that firewalls are very good products that assure their systems as well as their sensitive business information is widely acceptable. They tend to be treated as panacea, but they are just a technical solution with which a security policy could be partially enforced. Antivirus software and software installation control policies are wide used practices from administrators for preventing users from damaging their computer systems, accidentally or deliberately, by using nonapproved applications. Their effectiveness though resides on their implementation policy (frequent checks, frequent updates etc.), therefore in procedural factors. Indeed, users said that security measures that are provided are considered to be enough, but end-users are reluctant to use them, as they consider them as burden. An example is the use of passwords for authentication, as most of the end users in some of the reviewed organisations left them blank. As for existent integration techniques, most of the interviewees agreed that they try to achieve it, when it is required, through practices such as compliance with standards and relevant certification (e.g. ISO 9000 series), enhancement of the nonfunctional requirements for prospective systems with security requirements and exploitation of baseline features incorporated to acquired products'/ systems' by their vendors. We believe that these findings are very important as they pinpoint the core of a future methodological discipline to face the problem of integration of development processes with security concerns. In addition, two very interesting arguments could enhance this core; only one of the interviewees signified the importance of awareness and training, so that users treat the systems they use properly. Furthermore, only two referred to the fact that there is a need for creating a common understanding between the stakeholders, so that a common perception of security concerns can be the driving force of the integration.
Therefore there is no pure methodological approach for the integration of the security requirements to the development processes, and wherever this happens, it does so empirically, by exploiting previous experiences and basic features provided per situation. On the other hand, there is a serious emerging trend concerning all kinds of organisations (IT users, developers and consultants) for the integration of security concerns and systems development, so as to be able to produce and use truly secure systems.
Another important question concerned what people thought was missing from the existing practices. Not surprisingly, they responded they lack methodological support for achieving integration of security concerns, not only to development processes, but to everyday organisational life as well. On the other hand, many thought that existing diagrammatical techniques are not that powerful to represent potential risks against a system, do not produce an efficient model that describes roles and responsibilities of the organisation to use a system and that they cannot adequately visualise the nonfunctional requirements of the system. Most of the existing models are static, referring to à`p icture'' of the organisation and cannot include timing and risk transformation over different intervals. The last subject to be identified as missing was ways of advancing the end-users' motivation in keeping with a security policy and understanding the necessity of applying it.
Conclusions
We think that practitioners that try to integrate security concerns into the lifecycle of information systems development should work their way towards it by developing common understanding between stakeholders by the use of and compliance with standards or other disciplined approaches (like risk analysis), a key role in which plays: the efficient modelling of the organisational environment; and the proper exploitation of those models extracted.
Furthermore, development practices and scenarios vary, so do practices of integration. In general and according to the development practice, we can identify the following high level counter-practices: setting up of a security policy; assurance that it complies with industry standards/laws; and verification of the policy's competence and the system's security level by analysing the risks against it.
Associating contemporary IS development approaches with IS security practices So far we have presented findings in terms of replies to our instrument's questions and our visual tools for introducing these facts. Given our concerns and our intention of constructing in the future a viable solution for integrating systems security to systems development, we shall structure the knowledge acquired so far to à`c ore'' that could constitute the heart of a methodological approach at later phases of our research.
As a first step to that we constructed Table VI , where one can see what practitioners do today to secure their systems when they choose to apply a specific development approach. The arguments which emerged through our field study, according to their ascertained use, are summarised and presented.
[ 195 ] There are many security issues that remain the same throughout all development approaches, however, the concerns per development approach vary with their nature. For instance, for custom development where the entire IS is to be produced as a proprietary construction and for a particular organisation, it is very important not to omit security requirements in the requirements collection phase, whichever development methodology is used. Researchers have been lately working on the integration of such kinds of requirements to the functional requirements of the information system (Felici et al., 2000; Hayam and Oz, 1993) .
On the other hand, when building a system through ready-made acquired technologies/ services an important thing to take care of is security standard assurance and compliance of the components, wherever this is plausible, and concern for baseline security features provision within these. Similar concerns should be launched when making up an IS through configuration development; proper and full exploitation of the embedded security features is the way to ensure the system's security.
Summary and further research
In the light of the previous findings, subjects requiring further research were identified as: 1 There was an explicit statement of the need for a methodological support of the integration of security to systems development processes. 2 People required advanced modelling techniques for:
representing the organisational activities, including models for an efficient description of roles and their corresponding responsibilities; and meaningful non-functional requirements diagrammatical representation. 3 An important aspect emerged to be the dynamic representation of risk and its timing concerns. 4 Some realised that another thing that is required is proper training features and ways of advancing user motivation.
As we are moving towards a future where nations will be crisscrossed with high capacity data networks, linking together most of the computers over the earth, many assets are and will be in the form of information that is stored, processed and transmitted by IT products, systems, or applications that meet requirements laid down by the owners of information and the systems' stakeholders. Thus, new forms of trading, like e-commerce, require a robust and secure technical infrastructure, in order to be properly performed and be fully exploited. Ethical issues related to the use of that infrastructure are emerging as important aspects of the information age. Privacy and data protection of the individual are major concerns and they should be assured by appropriate technologies. Contemporary information systems should perform their functions whilst ensuring information protection against hazards such as unwanted or unwarranted dissemination, alteration, or loss. The integration of security to development processes will facilitate the prevention and mitigation of these and similar hazards. 
